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The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has been
in business for twenty-eight years now. Although its purview includes
things besides patent law, its raison d' tre was unmistakable. It was
supposed to rationalize the judge-made part of patent law by taking
exclusive jurisdiction of appeals in patent cases. Congress and the
patent bar hoped that it would eliminate stark differences in approaches
and outcomes among the eleven regional federal circuits and thereby
discourage forum shopping in patent cases, which had become rampant.'
Although that was the principal motivation for its formation, there
were others less readily confessed. Few federal judges sought patent
cases, for few of them had sufficient acquaintance with patent law or
with the many fields of science and technology that underlie it.
Therefore, they felt uncomfortable and sometimes incompetent to rule
on patent matters. Having a single court with judges chosen and
assigned to decide patent cases seemed like something that might make
the judiciary happier.
There were, of course, dissenters. Some scholars and judges argued
that good judging demands generalists, not narrow specialists who might
perpetuate error in their exclusive corner. Specialists might also fail to
weave the narrow fabric of patent law into the seamless web that is the
. C 2011 Jay Dratler, Jr., Goodyear Professor of Intellectual Property, Emeritus, University of
Akron School of Law.
1. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5, 7, 18-20 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15, 17,
28-30.
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law as a whole. These arguments held some abstract attraction, but they
fell under the weight of statistics showing rampant forum shopping and
complaints about procedural shenanigans having little to do with
innovation and much to do with strategic advantage in litigation. And so
on October 1, 1982, the Federal Circuit was born.
The Federal Circuit did achieve its stated goal of curtailing forum-
shopping in patent cases. It could hardly fail to, for Congress granted it
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from all the federal district
courts, as well as the PTO.3 There was a small delay while the court
figured out how to prevent the parties from manipulating appellate
jurisdiction;4 but once it solved that problem, litigants found it hard to
circumvent appealing to the single, specialized court.
The court had less success, however, in solving what I call
"Thomas Jefferson's problem." As we shall see, Jefferson was one of
only two Founders with a serious interest in science and technology. He
had invented several important improvements to plows. So it was
natural for him, in his capacity as Secretary of State, to found our first
patent board and draft our first patent statute.
Jefferson abhorred monopolies. He wanted to include a prohibition
against them in our Bill of Rights. James Madison had to convince him
that temporary monopolies for patents and copyright would encourage
creativity and innovation.
So Jefferson understood that not everything new ought to be
patented. He made a stab at drawing the line by coining the phrase
"sufficiently useful and important" to impose a greater-than-novelty
requirement for patenting.6 He hoped that, with time and practice, his
patent board would develop more specific rules for determining what
novelties deserve patent protection and what do not, and how broadly a
patent controls future commerce and innovation.
2. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 57
(providing that Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals filed after that date).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (4)(A), (4)(C) (2000).
4. The Supreme Court established the "well pleaded complaint" rule for determining the
court's appellate jurisdiction six years later. See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988). See also Holmes Group v. Cornado Air Circulation Systems, 535 U.S.
826, 827, 834 (2002) (stating no jurisdiction where only counterclaim, not complaint, raises issue of
patent law).
5. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1966) (summarizing Jefferson's work as
organizer of our patent system, author of first patent law, ex officio member of first patent board,
and notable inventor).
6. Id. at 7 (quoting Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. I10) (emphasis added).
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But Jefferson had "higher duties" as Secretary of State and later
President. So after a few years, he left it to others and to the judiciary to
complete the "slow progress [with which] a system of general rules
could be matured."7  That task, of course, still occupies us over two
centuries later.
As momentum for the Federal Circuit was building, there was some
hope that it might help. This hope was hardly a major-let alone the
major-reason for its founding. But like Jefferson, some scholars and
judges hope that application of willing, not coerced, judicial intelligence
to Jefferson's problem might eventually produce results.
Unfortunately, things have not quite worked out that way. Many of
the "general rules" that the Federal Circuit developed in its effort to
simplify patent law turned out to be too crabbed and formalistic to do the
job that Jefferson intended. As a result, the Supreme Court has had to
step in. In virtually every case where it has done so, the High Court has
rejected a narrow, formulaic rule proposed by the Federal Circuit and
opted for something more general and flexible.
This paper analyzes some key cases of that sort. In the process, it
attempts to answer the question "why"? Why did a specialized court fail
to solve Jefferson's problem? Are the "general rules" that Jefferson
sought an illusion, or can we find them, and, if so, how?
I. THE PROBLEM OF EQUIVALENTS
We begin not with what is patentable, but how far a patent extends.
A patented invention is not like a book or diagram, which contains its
own description. To be sure, a skilled technologist might be able to
examine an invention, determine what it does, and see how it works.
But even the most highly skilled person cannot determine what is new
about an invention-let alone what makes it worthy of a patent-without
some knowledge external to the invention itself.
To solve this problem, patent law soon fixed on the expedient of
"claims." These are simply a series of highly formalized verbal
assertions of what about the invention makes it new and patentable.
At first, the law relied on so-called "central" claims, which tried to
describe the "essence" or "center" of the invention that made it new and
7. Id. at 10 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813),
reprinted in VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-181 (Washington ed., 1853-54)).
8. See I JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 2A.03[1] (L.J. Press 1991 & Supps.)
[hereinafter DRATLER & McJOHN, IP] (discussing patent claims and their construction in depth).
2011] I187
3
Dratler: The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
patentable. But over time, during the nineteenth century, the law found
central claiming inadequate and turned to "peripheral" claiming. The
idea of "peripheral" claims-which today we just call "claims"-was to
describe verbally every element of the invention that is new and
patentable with respect to "prior art."'
Today, claims are the essence of every utility patent. They appear
at the end of the patent document, after the narrative "specification" has
described the invention, how it works and what it does generally. They
have been likened to the "metes and bounds" in a description of real
property, for they define the invention and the patentee's legal rights in
it.1o
Claims have both a benefit and a burden. They benefit the patentee
and the public by specifying precisely where the patentee's temporary
legal monopoly ends. But they also burden the patentee by committing
her to a form of words that may or may not accurately cover the essence
of her invention, i.e., her contribution to technology. A clever usurper
may find a way to steal what the patentee really discovered without
infringing on what the literal language of the claims describes.
Beginning in 1854, the law learned how to prevent injustice of this
sort." The means was a thing that came to be called the "doctrine of
equivalents." If a defendant uses something that is "equivalent" to what
the patents claims describe, then he infringes, even though the literal
language of the claims does not "read on" his device.12
It takes only a moment's thought to understand three consequences
of the doctrine of equivalents. First, they undermine the very purpose of
having claims in the first place. There is no getting around this
fact-which sparked sharp dissents in two seminal cases on point.13 If
you "fuzzy up" the precise meaning of the claims to prevent injustice,
you dilute the certainty and public notice that claims are supposed to
9. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1566 & n.18 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), affd, 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (describing the transition from central to peripheral
claiming).
10. Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (stating "A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent
confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention").
I1. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1854).
12. DRATLER & MCJOHN, IP, supra note 8, § 2A.03[2] (discussing doctrine of equivalents in
depth).
13. See Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 617
(1950) (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting); Winans, 56 U.S. at 347 (Campbell, J., joined by three
justices, dissenting).
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provide. The goals of clarity, certainty, and economy are always in
tension with the elusive goal of substantive justice.
Second, once you expand the scope of claims beyond their literal
meaning, semantics can no longer be your guide. There must be some
principle, external to the language of the claims themselves, that
determines how far their coverage can be stretched. Finally, the whole
matter is a well-known feature of American law generally: a penchant
for doing justice regardless of the uncertainty and litigation expense that
doing justice in every case may create. Transaction costs be damned; we
want justice!
But what external principles can we invent for this purpose? Are
they semantic? Meta-semantic? Or must they inevitably be scientific
and technological?
My favorite case is Coning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric USA,
Inc.,14 which I have also discussed in an earlier article. The patentee
had been trying to find a way to reduce power loss in light beams
traveling through optical fiber.' 6  He recalled a principle of basic
physics, under which a light ray hitting a material interface, at an oblique
angle, from a medium with higher index of refraction to one with lower,
is totally reflected internally.' 7  This principle is responsible for the
mirror-like effect that you see when looking upward at the surface of the
water from inside a swimming pool. Like water as compared to air, the
"inside" medium must have a higher index of refraction than the
"outside" one to achieve the reflection effect.
The patentee applied this principle to optical fiber by "doping" an
inner cylindrical core with impurities to give it a higher index of
refraction than the pure cladding.' 8 His claims described that technique,
and only that technique.'9 The defendant used the same principle,
without literally infringing the claims, by doping the cladding to lower
its index of refraction compared to the cylindrical core.20 The court had
no trouble finding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, for the
defendant had copied the patentee's discovery, if not his precise
means.21
14. Sumitomo, 868 F.2d at 1257-62.
15. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Fixing Our Broken Patent System, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
47, 82 n.84 (2010) [hereinafter Dratler, Fixing].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Sumitomo, 868 F.2d at 1254.
19. Id. at 1255.
20. Id. at 1255-57.
21. Id. at 1260-61.
201l]1 189
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This case goes a long way to answering our question about external
principles. There is no semantics or meta-semantics that could have
reliably and honestly reached that result. You have to know some
physics. Only when you have taken a college physics course and
understand the principle of total internal reflection and how it works
does the result make any sense at all. Without that principle, the law
would look as if it were actualizing Jonathan Swift's parody, claiming
that black is white.
This brings us to what, in my view, is the most revealing case in
which the Supreme Court brought the Federal Circuit to heel, Festo.22
Sensing Tom Jefferson's mandate to simplify and regularize patent law,
make its outcomes more certain, and reduce its extraordinary expense,
the Federal Circuit sought ways to limit the doctrine of equivalents.
Eventually, it settled on two. First, the doctrine would not apply to
inventions as a whole, or even to whole claims. It would apply only to
claim elements, i.e., separate and distinct semantic portions of claims
having corresponding identifiable aspects of physical components or
process steps.23 Second, the doctrine would not apply to any claim
element that had been amended in the course of patent prosecution, for
whatever reason.24 This latter rule was called a "complete bar" to the
doctrine by virtue of a claim-element amendment.2 5
There is a lot of historical background and nuance to the Festo
decision and its predecessors. Suffice it here to say that the Supreme
Court accepted the first limitation2 6 but not the second.27 Equivalents
now apply only on an element-by-element basis, but courts must look at
the reason(s) for amending claim elements before deciding that no range
of equivalents will apply to them. If the amendments were intended to
limit the element, for example, to avoid prior art, then they may limit the
doctrine of equivalents. Otherwise, they may not. In so ruling, the
Court rejected what it saw as an overly rigid, inflexible and literalistic
limitation.28
22. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
23. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 936-39 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en
banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
24. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566-69 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722, (2002).
25. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 740.
26. The Supreme Court approved the element-by-element rule in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
27. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 737-39.
28. Id. at 737-38.
190 [S:185
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It may help understanding to apply the element-by-element doctrine
to the Sumitomo case. At first glance, the element-by-element approach
would seem to vitiate the doctrine of equivalents, since the two elements
(core and cladding) must act in synergy to realize the desired effect of
total internal reflection. Yet one could just as easily reason that the
positively doped core in the patented invention is the equivalent of the
undoped core used by the defendant, since it provides a higher index of
refraction relative to the cladding, while the defendant's negatively
doped cladding is equivalent to the patentee's undoped cladding for the
same reason. Whether this reasoning could sustain the result in
Sumitomo, however, is unclear, for that decision predated Festo.
As for the second limitation, the Supreme Court was clearly right as
a matter of substance. If the doctrine of equivalents is to exist at all,
with all its problems, it cannot be subverted by amendments that have
nothing to do with patent scope or prior art. The "complete bar" rule
that the Federal Circuit had proposed would only have discouraged
amendments to claims and made them a trap for the unwary. It might
also have encouraged more care in patent prosecution but undoubtedly
would have occasioned more delay and expense, as every trial of patent
infringement would have blossomed into minute examination of the
prosecution history of every relevant claim element.
The High Court, of course, rested its decision on the language of
the statute and on precedent, not policy.2 9 As a result, it did not disturb
the essence of the doctrine of equivalents: that ideas as to what is
''equivalent" must come from something besides the claims under
analysis and semantics, namely science and technology. Fortunately, an
old precedent recites a number of factors-all practical matters of
science and technology-which bear on what is "equivalent" to what.30
II. THE PROBLEM OF "OBVIOUSNESS"
So far, we have looked at Jefferson's problem backwards, focusing
on the question of patent scope and infringement before considering
what is patentable. We have done so because the doctrine of equivalents
illustrates so beautifully the futility of seeking a solution in claim
semantics alone.
But now we must come to the essence of the problem: determining
what else an invention must have besides novelty to justify what
29. Id. at 737-40.
30. See Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609-11
(1950) (majority opinion).
201l] 191
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Jefferson called "the embarrassment of an exclusive patent."' That
"embarrassment," economists now know, is a standard set of evils
associated with nearly every monopoly: higher prices, lower output, less
responsiveness to customers, slower innovation, and less product
variety, as compared to a fully competitive market. When does the
benefit of providing financial incentives for innovation outweigh this
"embarrassment," and can we express the answer in Jefferson's "general
rules"?
Of course our statute propounds an answer: an invention's
nonobviousness with respect to prior art. If the invention as a whole
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time it was made, it is not patentable.32 This criterion makes
patentability depend on inferred cognitive difficulty, rather than any of
the much sounder and more realistic criteria that innovators and their
investors actually use in the real world.
I have lambasted this economically vapid abstraction in three
earlier articles, in one of which I proposed an economically sensible
(and litigable!) substitute.34 I will not repeat the criticism here. Suffice
it to say that virtually everyone who has studied the subject is skeptical
of this criterion as a sound general solution to Jefferson's problem, let
alone an economical one, although a recent economically-oriented paper
suggests that it at least points generally in the right direction.35
But again feeling a mandate to simplify doctrine and reduce
uncertainty and expense, the Federal Circuit tried to simplify what about
prior art makes an invention "obvious." An invention requiring a
31. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 180-81).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
33. See Dratler, Fixing, supra note 15, at 69-75 (proposing modem economic criteria, well
accepted in the business world, to replace the nonobviousness requirement, and explaining the reasons
for and advantages of doing so in footnotes); Jay Dratler, Jr., Invention is a Process, or Why the
Electronics and Pharmaceutical Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents 44-48 (U. of Akron Legal
Studies Research, Paper No. 06-13, July 2006), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=899924 [hereinafter, Dratler, Process] (describing
how economic error of basing patentability on cognitive difficulty-nonobviousness-arose out of
related error of confusing extended process of invention with single, abstract act of conception); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REv. 299, 309-19 (2005)
(arguing that current standard of nonobviousness departs from the spirit of Framers' original standard by
emphasizing cognitive difficulty over economic factors like risk).
34. Dratler, Fixing, supra note 15, at 69-75.
35. Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots And Sticks: A Model Of
Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 547 (2008) (using rough quantitative and graphical
analysis to suggest that the nonobviousness criterion at least is not inconsistent with rational patent
incentives).
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combination of prior art is obvious, it decreed, if and only if a "teaching,
suggestion or motivation" appears in the prior art to combine them.
Apparently the court included the word "motivation" for flexibility. But
in practice it nearly always required an explicit suggestion to combine
the prior-art references in order to render the invention obvious and
therefore unpatentable.36
In its KSR decision, the Supreme Court disagreed.3 7 Reviewing the
statute, its legislative history, and its own relevant precedent, the High
Court rejected the so-called "TSM" test as too rigid, formalistic, and
narrow.38  Obviousness, it said, depends upon what the hypothetical
person of ordinary skill in the art ("HYPOSA") would know and would
think, which is, in all cases, a matter of evidence and proof. 9 It thus
rejected the Federal Circuit's attempt to simplify doctrine and increase
certainty by essentially procedural means. The High Court thereby
promoted the usual cause of substantive justice at any cost.
But implicit in the Court's holding and reasoning was a much more
powerful principle. What an HYPOSA would know or think is a matter
of science and technology, extraneous to law and claim semantics. You
cannot find it by reading the entrails of claims, and you cannot tease it
out by sophistry. You have to consult scientists and engineers
themselves, who, after all, are the only candidates for HYPOSA-except
in the case of patents on business methods, which we will get to shortly.
So in analyzing what ought to be patentable, as in analyzing what
the scope of a patent to be, we come to the same conclusion. You
cannot solve Tom Jefferson's problem purely with words. You have to
know something about the invention and the science and technology that
underlie it. Without that knowledge, you will not surpass the grasp of
medieval monks debating the number of angels that fit upon a pinhead.
36. See DRATLER & MCJOHN, IP, supra note 8, § 2.06[6] (discussing Federal Circuit's TSM
test, now repudiated by the Supreme Court).
37. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-21 (2007).
38. Id. at 419 (stating "The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasizing the
importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents"); see also id. at 427-28
(characterizing "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test as "narrow," "rigid," and inconsistent with
the statute and case law).
39. Id. at 420 (stating Federal Circuit erred in assuming "that a person of ordinary skill
attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the
same problem"); id. at 420-21 (rejecting the Federal Circuit's narrow restriction on applicable prior
art because "[c]ommon sense teaches ... that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle").
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HI. WHAT PATENTS MEAN
At this point, it is useful to break up our review of High-Court
reprimands with an instance in which the Federal Circuit's simplification
effort succeeded. Before it took up the issue, deciding what claim
language means could be an extensive, expensive process. Courts
addressing claim construction might consider affidavits or live testimony
of the inventor, the claim drafter (if different), and third parties,
including interested parties and putatively disinterested experts.4 0
All that came to a screeching halt after the Federal Circuit's
decision in Vitronics.4 1 The court ruled that the claims themselves, the
patent specification (narrative description and drawings), and the file
history of patent prosecution are the only readily accessible "public
record" of what a patent's claims mean.42 As such, it said, they should
be the first evidence used to construe the claims.43 Resort to other
evidence-especially nonpublic testimony of parties and
experts-should be made only in extremis, when and only when, after all
else, ambiguity still remains.4
A later en banc decision, holding that claim construction is a matter
of law,45 produced dissenting and concurring opinions that appeared to
challenge the full court's preference for so-called "intrinsic" evidence
(intrinsic to the patent and its prosecution history).4 6 Judge Newman, in
her "additional views," summed up these critiques as follows:
The value of extrinsic evidence in claim interpretation is not
surprising, because patent documents are written by and for persons in
the field of the invention, not for judges. Judges not only need a larger
understanding of the science or technology, but we also need help with
40. See DRATLER & MCJOHN, IP, supra note 8, § 2A.03[l][c] (discussing evidence used in
construing claims).
41. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
42. Id. at 1583.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (holding that claim construction is pure issue of law, and implying that evidence "extrinsic" to
the patent and its prosecution history is secondary and useful only for informing legal analysis).
46. See id. at 1472 (Mayer, C.J., joined by Newman, J., concurring, relying heavily on expert
testimony below); see also id. at 1474 (Rader, J., asserting that trial judges often rely on expert
testimony to construe claims, and criticizing majority's view that such testimony only helps
"understand" them); see also id. at 1475, 1477-78 (noting trial judges' need for expert testimony
and frustration with limitations on its use at trial on claim construction); see also id. at 1479-80
(Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J., in "additional views," interpreting majority's ruling as holding
that the Federal Circuit "will not consider factual findings of the trial court, [and] expressly
disavowing such actions by prior panels," and criticizing that rule as unhelpful to trial judges).
194 [5:185
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understanding how the particular terms as used in the patent are
viewed by persons in the field of the invention.47
Her views in this regard are worthy of note, because she has the
most intimate acquaintance with science of any judge on the court: a
Ph.D. in Chemistry and four years as a research scientist.48
As an ex-scientist, too, I have great sympathy with Judge
Newman's general point. But I think in this case her aim was
misdirected. Under our law today, a patent is supposed to be a self-
contained semantic system. The specification describes what the
invention is, and the claims fix its legal limits.
Today, lawyers nearly always draft the claims, after reading and
massaging the inventor's specification and collaborating at great length
with him or her. If these worthies cannot produce something on which
they are willing to rely, and which the public can retrieve on-line to
assess the extent of patent protection, what good is a patent? In
particular, what good are claims?
If the patent is not the self-contained semantic system that it is
supposed to be, we ought to throw it out and go back to a general
description of what the invention is (central claiming) and have a full
trial on its validity, scope and infringement, with a battle of the experts
in every case. For if we cannot rely on the patent for anything solid,
then drafting, prosecuting, and issuing it probably expend much more
effort, time and money, and accomplish much less, than is required to
provide reasonable incentives for innovation.
Where Judge Newman's insights have real bite, in my view, is
when we go outside the self-contained semantic system of the patent and
its prosecution history into the real world. That is what happens when
we compare the patent (and its already-construed claims) to prior art in
order to assess its validity, and when we compare the construed claims,
either literally or by equivalents, to an accused device to assess
infringement. Then there can be no pretense that the patent is self-
contained, or that the teachings of science and technology, brought into
the courtroom through the HYPOSA or other witnesses, should not play
a leading role.
This economy of approach is even more important today, when
claim construction in hard-fought cases routinely takes an appeal to the
47. Id. at 1480 (Newman, J., joined by Mayer, C.J., "additional views").
48. Judge Newman's official biography,
httpJ/www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php?option-com content&view=article&id=126-pauline-newman-
circuit-judge&catid=1:judges&Itemid-24 (last visited Oct 19,2010).
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Federal Circuit and sometimes two. If the trial required a full battle of
experts and others, we might double the cost of deciding just what the
claims mean. So while there is merit in Judge Newman's general point
that patent law cannot ignore science and technology, we can, without
undue injustice or unfairness, dispense with so-called "extrinsic
evidence" in construing the words that inventors and their attorneys
themselves drafted to describe inventions. In that sense, the Vitronics
rule seems, at least to me, the most sensible and successful outcome of
the Federal Circuit's simplification efforts.
IV. BUSINESS-METHOD PATENTS
This brings us to Bilski.4 9  I have railed against business-method
patents in at least two articles.50 I will not bore the reader by repeating
or even summarizing their substance here. Suffice it to make a
prediction: if any nation with serious innovative capacity (China,
maybe?) were to refuse to follow our lead and decline to recognize
business ideas as patentable inventions, it would gradually pull away
from us in real industrial innovation-and by virtue of a far less costly
and wasteful patent and patent-licensing system-like a sailboat with
better trimmed sails.
Doing so might be risky from an international trade perspective, for
the TRIPs Agreement treats all subject matter as eligible for patenting,
without exception for business methods.51 Although State Street52 was
still more than two years away when the TRIPs Agreement was ratified,
we and other WTO members might still argue that the international
49. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
50. See Dratler, Fixing, supra note 15, at 62-64 (proposing language for patent act revision,
which would outlaw business-method and most software patents, and explaining why in footnotes);
Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-Method
Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 823, 840-53, 871-76 (arguing that business methods involve
market risk more than technological risk and therefore are inappropriate for patent incentives, and
that patents on business methods erase the line between unlawful business monopolies and
temporary patent monopolies in place since the Statute of Monopolies was enacted nearly four
centuries ago).
51. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONs 320 (1999),
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (TRIPs Agreement), Art. 27, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips e/tagm3c e.htm#5 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
52. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (taking opportunity to "lay to rest" what the court saw as "ill-conceived exception" to
patentable subject matter for business methods).
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community painted itself into a corner that cannot be exited without a
massive renegotiation unlikely ever to happen.
That is only one of many reasons why the Supreme Court's
decision in Bilski was much ado about nothing. There are three others.
First, despite the length of its splintered opinions, the Court did little
more than instruct the Federal Circuit to do what we tell our students to
do: mind the language of the statute and precedents.53 It rejected the
Federal Circuit's "machine or transformation" test as having no basis in
the patent statute or the High Court's many decisions on judge-made
exclusions from patentable subject matter. 4
Second, although that instruction was legally right and proper, it is
likely to do little good. The Federal Circuit has tried on its own for
nearly three decades to draw the line between abstract ideas and concrete
inventions, with many self-reversals and without notable success." If
the task were easy, it would have been done by now.
Finally, the Supreme Court majority failed to do-or to invite and
authorize the Federal Circuit to do-two things that might have helped
cut the Gordian knot: (1) consider economic criteria in considering what
is patentable, and (2) receive the wisdom of scientists and engineers. I
suspect that scientists and engineers would be virtually unanimous, if
polled, in believing that one-click shopping, for example, is not a
patentable invention, regardless of whether one conceives it as a new,
useful, and (from a purely business perspective) nonobvious advance.
As for State Street, when I ask my students with programming
experience whether they see themselves as "inventing" while doing
routine programming for business, engineering, or home purposes, they
just laugh.
Why does subject matter make a difference? The current rage is to
opine, without much solid evidence, that careful application of the
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness requirements would eliminate all
the spurious patents that a stricter review of subject matter might. But
even if so, those requirements would not eliminate the expense.
53. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226-27 (majority opinion). The Court limited its holding
carefully, saying "the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting
inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent,
creative application of general principles. Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a position
on where that balance ought to be struck. " Id at 3228.
54. Id. at 3327-28.
55. For an in-depth review, see DRATLER & MCJOHN, IP, supra note 8, § 2.03[3], esp. [c].
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Full-bore patent litigation in major cities today costs each side over
56$5 million dollars, in some cases approaching $10 million. The beauty
of enforcing subject-matter limitations as the High Court once did57 is
that they do not require claim construction, analysis of prior art, or
exhaustive analysis of infringement both literally and by equivalents.
Subject-matter limitations are matters of law, enforceable on summary
judgment, perhaps with one appeal. Applied strictly in light of the
patent system's economic purposes, they would vastly cut the amounts
we waste in prosecuting, licensing, and litigating patents on non-
inventions.
Of course there are doctrinal and practical impediments to this rosy
picture. Congress muddied the waters considerably by mentioning
business methods in the defense in section 273, thereby implying
approval of them. Many businesses have invested heavily in them and
would scream bloody murder if the courts or Congress threatened to take
them away. But I suspect that more thoughtful business leaders,
especially those involved in real industrial innovation, would see their
demise much like trimming the "thickets" of electronic and software
patents against which so many real innovators testified early in this
decade. 9
One final reason why Bilski did little was that it did not touch State
Street's most controversial holding: that the rule against patenting
business ideas was ill advised and in fact never existed.60 Until someone
56. Bat Showalter, Baker Botts LLP, Cost of Patent Litigation, paper delivered at AILPA
Midwinter Conference (Jan. 25, 2008), available at
http*/www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/SpeakerPapers/Mid-winterl/20083/Showalter-slides.pdf
(last visited Oct 19, 2010), Slide 7 (after title slide).
57. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (asserting "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" cannot be patented) (dictum); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-
95 (1978) (stating mathematical formula is not patentable, even as limited to use in cracking
hydrocarbons); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 71-72 (1972) (holding that algorithm for
converting binary-coded decimal numbers to binary numbers in digital computers is not patentable);
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (saying combination of
naturally occurring nitrogen-fixing bacteria was not patentable subject matter, although particular
combination was not found in nature); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112-21 (1853) (explaining
principles of electromagnetism are not patentable, even if confined to telecommunication).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 273, esp. (a)(3).
59. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, at 6 (Oct. 28, 2003) (Executive Summary discussing
effects of huge patent portfolios), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm (visited
Oct. 19, 2010); id. at ch. 3, 34-37 (discussing how patent thickets impede innovation in electronics
industry); id. at ch. 3, at 50-55 (similar analysis for software and Internet industries).
60. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
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dares to bring that issue before the high Court, most of the points of law
and economics in this section will be moot.
To sum up: Bilski represents another mild reprimand of the Federal
Circuit for failing to follow higher authority in statute and precedent.
But it failed to provide much guidance for doing so, preferring instead to
advise, in effect, "use good judgment." Most of all, it failed to give any
hint whether considering the purpose of patents, the history of the Patent
and Copyright Clause, and our vastly greater understanding of
economics today is appropriate for any court, let alone an inferior court,
in solving the subject-matter riddle specifically or Thomas Jefferson's
problem generally.
V. C.P. SNOW's Two CULTURES
There are other cases in which the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit. But there is little to say about them, except that the
High Court properly rejected crabbed, narrow and formalistic
61interpretations of principles of law not unique to patents. In eBay, the
High-Court rejected a "matter of course" rule for granting injunctions in
patent cases and instructed the Federal Circuit to apply the same four-
factor test that every other court applies in every other matter. In
MedImmune,62 the High-Court rejected an interpretation of Article III
erroneously based on the parties' relative strategic advantage and
instructed the Federal Circuit and lower courts to return to controlling
principles of separation of powers on which the "case or controversy"
requirement is based.63
But as injunctions and declaratory judgments are not unique to
patent law, the effect of the High Court's decisions in eBay and
MedImmune was merely to bring the Federal Circuit's supervision of
patent law back into line with the law generally. Those cases did
nothing to change or adjust the Federal Circuit's view of principles of
pure patent law.
What is missing from all this supposed ferment is badly needed re-
adjustment of the relationship between our patent system and the science
and technology that it purports to advance. Fundamental questions
remain whether patents on the results of basic research-pieces of a
61. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92 (2006) (holding that
permanent injunctions in patent cases, as in other cases, require satisfaction of traditional four-part
equitable test).
62. Medlmnune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130-31,137 (2007).
63. See JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2A.02[1] (L.J. Press
1994 & Supps.).
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puzzle discovered long before any commercially valuable solution-are
counterproductive, if not massively so." The doctrine of constructive
reduction to practice, which lets lawyers and others "invent" paper
abstractions, lie in the weeds and hold up real industries and their
substantial investment for ransom, remains unmodified, although it is a
judicial invention appearing nowhere in the statute.6 5  The criterion of
"nonobviousness," so obviously (pardon the expression) out of step with
modern economic learning about how innovation actually works in the
marketplace,66 remains free not only from reconsideration by Congress,
but from any attempt by the courts to infuse it with economic meaning
beyond the minimalist steps of the Graham Court forty-four years ago.
The High Court seems to re-invent fundamental doctrines of
constitutional law every few years. We who labor in the remote fields of
IP can only look with jealousy on its willingness to reconsider basic
principles there. Within the interstices of a patent statute that still leaves
much unsaid and much room for interpretation, the high Court is
palpably more cautious. I suspect the reason is what C.P. Snow, in his
famous eponymous book four decades ago, called The Two Cultures.6 8
Science and technology comprise as different a culture from law as
is possible to imagine. No two scientists would ever decide a technical
dispute by picking champions and paying them to argue before a
presumably neutral decision maker, any more than lawyers would
resolve a business dispute by turning on their precision instruments and
pulling out their pocket calculators. The gulf of misunderstanding
between the two cultures is undoubtedly as large, if not larger, than that
between Americans and Chinese or Americans and Afghans.
Good judges seem to understand this. One of the most candid and
poignant acknowledgments came early in our national history. In 1841,
Justice Story, then a circuit judge, penned the following description in a
copyright fair-use case:
64. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Combinatorial Mathematics and the Problem of Early-Stage Patents
in Biotechnology (U. of Akron Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 07-02, Jan. 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid-959462.
65. See Dratler Process, supra note 33, at 31-44.
66. See sources cited supra note 33.
67. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (stating "The inherent problem
[underlying nonobviousness and earlier similar criteria] was to develop some means of weeding out
those inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent").
68. The original book came out in 1959. Modem versions have additional material added in
the 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., C.P. Snow & Stefan Collini, The Two Cultures (Canto) (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1998) (1959).
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Patents and copyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases
belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the
metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be
very subtle and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent.9
Judge Smith of the Second Circuit echoed this lament by quoting
Justice Story approvingly 136 years later.70
This attitude is hardly surprising. From the very foundation of our
Republic, the leaders of all three of our Branches were lawyers and other
men of affairs. Only one of the thirty-nine signatories to our
Constitution-Benjamin Franklin-could reasonably have been
described as a "scientist" in the modem sense of that term. Among the
broader circle of our Founders, only Franklin and Thomas Jefferson
occupied themselves with technology. Franklin did experiments with
lighting and invented the lightning rod, and Jefferson invented plows
and other agricultural implements. That makes two among some fifty-
odd Founders.
Modem experimental and observational science is generally
thought to have arisen in the 1620s, with Galileo's invention of various
improvements on telescope and his use of them to study the
heavens-work that later helped inspire and inform Sir Isaac Newton's
path-breaking theory of gravitation. A span of well over a century
intervened between those seminal developments in human thinking and
ratification of our Constitution in 1791. Our Founders, all well-educated
men, were generally aware of them. Yet they simply did not consider
them important, let alone vital, to commerce or government. Nor,
except for Franklin and Jefferson, did they study them in detail.
Those were the days before the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in
America. So what we now call science and technology were objects of
purely "philosophical" interest, falling under the heading of "natural
philosophy." They were matters of curiosity for men of means and
learning, not matters of vital business or everyday concern as they are
today.
Thomas Jefferson's own story is illustrative. He had a strong
interest in science and technology, particularly as regards agriculture,
and he made several inventions himself. He therefore took an interest in
patent law, was partly responsible (along with James Madison) for the
Patent and Copyright Clause of our Constitution, drafted our first patent
statute, and helped set up and run our first patent office. But his
69. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
70. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977).
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involvement lasted only a few years before he turned away to "higher
duties."
The gap between the two cultures has only widened since Jefferson.
In his day, the law was sufficiently contained that a learned person could
master it and still dabble in other pursuits, like astronomy and plows. 7'
Today, the law is an all-consuming profession, from law school on.
Judges must have extensive legal training, which presupposes a verbal
and literary bent, not a scientific, technological, or quantitative one.
People go to law school, rather than engineering or science schools,
because they like to deal with people and words more than with things
and numbers. Their personal acquaintance with science, technology
(and their handmaiden mathematics) is therefore largely peripheral and
coincidental.
The composition of the Federal Circuit itself illustrates this point.72
Insofar as appears in their official biographies and other information
readily available on the Internet, its fifteen judges have the following
training and experience in science and technology:
Regular or Scientific or Scientific or Experience as Practice as Teaching
Senior Technical Technical Scientist or Patent Agent, Patent Law
Status Undergraduate Graduate Engineer Examiner or
Degree Degree Attorney
Regular 4/11 or 36% 3/11 or 27% 2/11 or 18% 4/11 or 36% 3/11 or 27%Status
Senior 1/4 or 25% 0/4 or 0% 0/4 or 0% 0/4 or 0% 1/4 or 25%Status
As this table shows, the regular judges' technical training and
experience vastly exceeds those of judges on senior status. But in no
case does any aspect of technical training or experience, including
experience with the patent system as a patent agent, attorney, or
examiner, exceed 40%. In other words, on each measure of training or
experience, the majority of judges on the Federal Circuit have none
beyond their experience on the Federal Circuit itself, or, in some cases,
its predecessor courts. (A majority has some relevant training or
71. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6-10.
72. The table and data below are derived from the judges' official biographies on the Federal
Circuit's official website, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/index.php (follow "Judges" hyperlink under
"THE COURT') (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). In some cases the subject matter of the judges'
degrees was obtained from other on-line sources.
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experience, however, due to the distribution of various aspects of
training or experience among members. For example, six out of eleven
regular-status judges, or 55%, have one or more of the following: an
undergraduate or graduate degree in science or engineering and
scientific or technical work experience.)
The Supreme Court is even more barren of scientific or technical
expertise. Insofar as official biographies and a quick Web search reveal,
not a single member of the High Court has so much as an undergraduate
major in any field of science or technology, although Justice Breyer's
extensive writings in economics as it relates to law suggest considerable
expertise in that field.
Insofar as the unique culture of science and technology are
concerned, the good justices have not even landed on the same
continent. They are observing the natives through a spyglass from a ship
offshore. How, then, can they appreciate what science and invention
really entail, not only not ever having done either, but not ever having
even studied either in any depth?
What does this state of affairs portend for patent law? The Federal
Circuit's repeated search for simplicity and certainty in formulaic rules
suggests little inclination to address the broad issues of patent reform
that so desperately need expert attention. Having had its wings clipped
repeatedly in its quest for simplicity and economy, that court is even less
likely to spread its wings on the updrafts of economics and the social
purpose of the patent system and soar toward fundamental reform.
The High Court, with far less expertise in science and technology
than its subordinate court, is even more conscious of its institutional
incompetence in matters of that court's special expertise.73 Far from
making bold moves toward institutional reform, even when only judge-
made law is at issue,74 the High Court has limited itself to correcting
patent misreadings of applicable statutes and precedents, especially
those that apply more broadly than just to patents. So those like me who
yearn for fundamental patent reform are unlikely to see it anytime soon,
either from a High Court conscious of its limited competence and
preoccupied (like Jefferson) with "higher duties," or from a Congress
largely captured by special interests in no hurry for reform.
73. See Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) (stating, after
explaining general principles of equivalence, "expecting] that the Federal Circuit will refine the
formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and
leav[ing] such refinement to that court's sound judgment in this area of its special expertise").
74. This, of course, is the case with all the judge-made exceptions to patentable subject
matter. See supra note 57.
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